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Background
In ecology, the term switching was first coined by Murdoch in 1969, to describe a sce-
nario where a predator predominantly eats the most common type of prey, see Murdoch 
(1969) and is often accompanied by a change in the habitat Khan (2000). Prey switching 
however happens when a predator’s preference for a particular type of prey increases as 
the prey increases in abundance. Any display by a predator, of prey switching behaviour, 
can significantly affect the stability of the system, coexistence of prey species and evolu-
tionary diversification. Switching can however promote coexistence between prey spe-
cies Abrams and Matsuda (2003). A classical example is the case where prey switching 
causes low predation for rare prey, thus aiding prey refugia that often leads to coexist-
ence Gentleman et al. (1990).
More often than not, political parties compete for membership. Members often switch 
between political parties as preferences change, often as a result of change of leader-
ship, policies and perceived gains Fieldhouse et al. (2007), Petersen (1991), Schofield and 
Sened (2005), Romero et al. (2009). This paper is motivated by the work in Misra (2012). 
A closer loot at the work in Misra (2012) shows that there were simplifying assumptions 
that made the mathematical model tractable but overlooking some essential elements 
such as switching. The parameters θ1 and θ2 model movements between political parties 
B and C. The net shifting of members θ = θ1 − θ2 is considered to be constant result-
ing in a unidirectional movement of members from B to C and vice versa. In this paper, 
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we relook at this assumption by introducing switching functions whose parameters are 
endogenous to the system.
The paper is arranged as follows: in  “The Misra model” section, we generalize the 
Misra model by including switching functions. The stabilities of the steady states are 
presented in “Stability of steady states” section and the paper is concluded in “Conclu-
sion” section.
The Misra model
The model uses principles of mathematical epidemiology to model the dynamics of the 
two political parties. In general, most dynamical social phenomenon may be modelled 
by using these epidemiological type differential equations, see for instance Petersen 
(1991), Alvarez and Nagler (2000), Burden (2004), Huckfeldt and Kohfeld (1992), 
Belenky and King (2007). Following Misra (2012), the model is based on the following 
system of equations:
Here, the total number of population N(t) which was assumed constant, was divided into 
three classes, namely; voters class V, political party B and political party C. The param-
eters and model assumptions are given in Misra (2012).
The non-dimensionalised model was obtained by setting
so that
The model was then reduced to a 2-dimensional system. One of the simplifying assump-
tion made in the paper was setting θ = θ1 − θ2 > 0. This then resulted in a system in 
which the individuals moved from party B to party C.
In this note we revisit the model in Misra (2012) and consider the following functions
where  α1,α2, m, θˆ1 and θˆ2  are positive constants, to capture the aspects of switching. 
The parameters m,α1 and α2 must be chosen such that θ1 and θ2 approach 1 when b, c 
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,
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approach 1. The parameter m affects the position of the switching point and α1,α2 affect 
both the switching point and the rate at which the switching occurs.
A graph of the function θ1 for different values of α1 with θˆ1 = 1 and m = 25 is depicted 
by Fig. 1.
Figure 1 shows switching increases with increasing values of α1. It is important to note 
that the graph of θ2 follows a similar pattern. The gradient function of θ1 is:
This function gives the change of θ1 with respect to b. This shows how the switching 
changes with respect to the state variable. Figure 2 shows the change in switching with 
respect to b for the chosen set of parameter values in the caption. The peak increases 
with increasing α1. This means that people leave party B for party C faster and after a 
while decreases. This is consistent with either Type I or Type II response functions in 
ecology.
Setting θ(t, b, c) = θ1 − θ2 =
θˆ1(1− e
−α1b)
1+me−α1b
−
θˆ2(1− e
−α2c)
1+me−α2c
, system (2) reduces to
Here θ(t, b, c) can either be positive or negative, thus allowing individuals to 
switch between political parties. Just as in Misra (2012), system (3) has four equilib-
ria, a party free equilibrium E0 = (0, 0), single party equilibria E1 = (1−
µ
β1
, 0) and 
E2 = (0, 1−
µ
β2
), whose existence is subject to β1 > µ and β2 > µ respectively and the 
dθ1
db
=
θˆ1α1(1+m)e
−α1b
(1+me−α1b)2
.
(3)
db
dt
= β1(1− b− c)b− θ(t, b, c)bc − µb,
dc
dt
= β2(1− b− c)c + θ(t, b, c)bc − µc.
Fig. 1 Graphs of  θ1  against  b  for different values of  α1
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interior equilibrium. Unlike in Misra (2012), the interior equilibrium is only unique for 
the case θ1(b) = θ2(c).
The graph of the switching function θ(t, b, c) against time is shown in Fig.  3. It is 
important note that the switching function is an increasing function that is initial nega-
tive until time ts and then becomes positive there after. The interior equilibrium depends 
on the sign of switching function θ(t).
We consider three possible scenarios:
(1)   The case θ(t, b, c) < 0. This is the case where members leave political party C for 
B, for all t < ts.
(2)  The case θ(t, b, c) = 0.
(3)   The case θ(t, b, c) > 0. This is the case considered in Misra (2012). This is the case 
where members leave political party B for C, for all t > ts where ts  is the time at 
which the switch occurs.
Stability of steady states
The stability of the boundary equilibria are presented in Misra (2012). If θ(t, b, c) = 0, we 
have
(4)
{
β1(1− b
∗ − c∗)− µ = 0,
β2(1− b
∗ − c∗)− µ = 0,
=⇒ b∗ + c∗ = 1−
µ
β1
and b
∗ + c∗ = 1−
µ
β2
.
Fig. 2 Graphs of 
dθ1
db
 against b by varying α1, and setting θˆ1 = 1 and m = 25
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From this system (4), the values of b∗ and c∗ are obtained as follows:
  • If β1 �= β2, then the interior equilibrium E(b∗, c∗)  does not exist.
  • If β1 = β2, then the interior equilibrium is stable and is a straight line satisfying the 
equation 
The existence of the interior equilibrium is numerically given in Fig. 4.
Figure 4 shows the existence of the stable interior equilibrium which is a straight line 
that satisfies the equation
whereas Fig. 5 shows the non-existence of the interior equilibrium when β1 �= β2.
We now consider the case when θ(t, b, c) �= 0. We begin by considering the plot in 
which political parties B and  C  coexist in a stable state. We come up with this result and 
both political parties start with an initial value of 0.2 at  t = 0.
A closer look at the Fig. 6 shows that there exists a time interval t < ts where members 
of political party C leave for political party B when θ(t) < 0. After that members of polit-
ical party B leave for party C before both become stable over the time. The correspond-
ing interior equilibrium is shown in Fig. 7.
{
b
∗
, c
∗ ∈ [0, 1]|b∗ + c∗ = 1−
µ
β1
}
.
{
b
∗
, c
∗ ∈ [0, 1]|b∗ + c∗ = 1−
µ
β1
}
when β1 = β2,
Fig. 3 Graphs of the switching function with respect to time
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An interesting aspect to consider is the switching by individuals that take place 
between political parties. To investigate such dynamics, we plot the variations of par-
ties B and C as the parameters α1, θˆ1, α2, and θˆ2 are varied. The results are depicted in 
Figs. 8, 9, 10 and 11. One can easily observe that increasing α1 and α2 leads to a decrease 
Fig. 4 β1 = β2 =
1
24
Fig. 5 β1 �= β2,β1 =
1
24
,β2 =
1
36
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of membership in both political parties. So to maintain their numbers, political par-
ties should focus on minimising any switching that can take place. A similar result is 
obtained for θˆ1 and θˆ2. Figures 8 and 9 show the evolution of political B over the time by 
Fig. 6 Time series plot for parties  B  and  C
Fig. 7 Phase plot for the interior equilibrium E(b∗ , c∗)
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Fig. 8 Variation of B with t for different values of α1
Fig. 9 Variation of B with t for different values of θˆ1
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Fig. 10 Variation of C with t for different values of α2
Fig. 11 Variation of C with t for different values of θˆ2
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varying the parameter values α1 and θˆ1 while keeping the other parameters constant. The 
figures show that when increasing the parameter values α1 and θˆ1, the number of mem-
bers of political B decrease over the time.
Similar plots for political party C for different values of α2 and θˆ2 are shown in Figs. 10 
and 11. The figures show that when increasing the parameter values α2 and θˆ2, leads to a 
decrease in the number of members of political party C over the time.
Conclusion
In this paper, we remodelled switching between political parties in the model formu-
lated in Misra (2012). This was achieved by removing the constraint that the difference 
between the net rates of movement between the two political parties be sign definite. We 
defined two switching functions that depend on the size of each political party and some 
parameters. These functions generalize the Misra paper in which the net movement was 
assumed to be unidirectional, or in favour of a given political party. In addition to some 
results obtained in Misra (2012), additional information regarding how the behaviour of 
the population size is dependent on the switching parameters is demonstrated.
The inclusion of switching functions in this paper improved the Misra (2012) model. 
There are further aspects that can be considered in future. Among these we mention 
the possibility of including individual preferences in choosing a political party. Another 
aspect will be the improvement of the model by considering a non constant population. 
An interesting aspect to consider is the age structured model, in view of the fact that 
political parties often target the youths for the future sustainability of the parties. There 
is however a trade off between mathematical tractability and realism. Finally, one can 
also look at how media companies influence the dynamics of political parties.
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